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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4)(f).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does the Defendants' failure to comply with Rule 11(e)(2) Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, and failure to marshal evidence in support of the jury's
verdict preclude their complaints about the trial court's denial of post-trial motions
and about various evidentiary rulings? If not, have Defendants failed to show that
any evidentiary errors were anything but harmless?
Standard of Review: An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
jury's findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trail court's findings
are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making
them "clearly erroneous." Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^[15, 979 P.2d 338. Appellants'
failure to marshal the evidence requires this Court to assume that all jury findings are
supported by the evidence. Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy. 958 P.2d 228, 233
(Utah 1998). Even if this Court were to consider these fact issues, they are reviewed for
whether any errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence were so substantial and
prejudicial that appellants were deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration
of the disputed issues by the jury.

Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987),

Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990).
2. Was the trial court correct in following undisturbed Utah precedents
holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor was not available to Defendants as a
defense to breach of warranty claims when the home they sold was unfinished,

1

new, and when the Defendants breached ongoing warranties and promises to the
Plaintiffs that survived the closing on the sale of the home for at least two years?
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law, reviewed for correctness. Grayson
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Gardner v. Maden.
949 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah App. 1997). However, this Court may affirm the trial court's
judgment on any available grounds. DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).
3. Was the trial court correct in following undisturbed Utah precedent
holding that an abrogation clause in a real estate purchase contract will not
preclude the recovery of attorneys fees when Defendants breach covenants that by
their own terms survive closing?
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness.
Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, 2000 UT App 121 f 13, 394 Utah Adv. Rep.
18; Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989);
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988);
Gardner v. Maden. 949 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah App. 1997). However, this Court may
affirm the trial court's judgment on any available grounds. DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d
428,444 (Utah 1995).
4. Was the trial court within its broad discretion in awarding $48,567 in
attorneys fees?
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed for patent error or clear abuse of
discretion.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998); City Consumer

Services Inc. v. Peters. 815 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 1991).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Court should affirm the judgment of the jury, and of the trial court, in every
respect.

The jury had ample evidence to find that the Defendants breached their

respective agreements and duties to the Plaintiffs. The trial court was correct in holding
that the doctrine of caveat emptor did not excuse the Defendants from performing the
promises they made to the Morrises. And the trial court was correct in holding that the
attorneys fee clause of the real estate purchase contract survived closing along with the
affirmative covenants that the Defendants made, and breached, by failing to properly
finish and warrant the home for which the Morrises paid over $400,000.
The central event of this case is the purchase of a new, unfinished home in Alpine,
Utah (the "Home") by Plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris ("Morrises") from
Defendants Dan and Cynthia Parkinson ("Parkinsons") for $408,000. Included in the
contract for sale of the Home were a number of express warranties that by their term
extended beyond the closing date of the sale for a period of two years. The Morrises' real
estate agent for the purchase was Defendant Guy Hatch ("Hatch"), who at the same time
he was under a duty to act for the benefit of the Morrises was also the designer and
builder of the Home, a partner with the record owners of the Home, and was the person
responsible for finishing the Home after the Morrises bought it. In conjunction with the
purchase of the Home, Plaintiff John Covey paid $25,000 to Defendant Linda Hatch to
perform certain acts, primarily involving the interior of the Home, to finish and complete
the Home. Thus Parkinsons owed duties to Morrises as sellers and warrantors. Hatch
owed duties to Morrises as their real estate agent. And Linda Hatch owed duties to John
Covey as a decorator.
At trial Morrises showed, and the Parkinsons' evidence conceded that there were a
number of defects in the Home that needed correction. The total dollar amount for such
3

corrections varied from approximately $15,000 (Defendant's evidence) to approximately
$150,000 (Plaintiffs evidence). The jury determined that Parkinsons owed Morrises
$42,220 for breach of warranty. The Parkinsons contended that because a number of
these defects were visible to the Morrises before closing, the doctrine of caveat emptor
excused Parkinsons from fixing the defects and finishing the Home. The trial court
correctly ruled that because the Home was new and unfinished at the time of sale, and
because the Parkinsons had expressly warranted the Home for a two year period
following closing, the mere "visibility" of the defects prior to closing did not excuse the
Parkinsons from performing their duties.
At trial, Hatch conceded that he was the agent for the Parkinsons and disputed that
he was the real estate agent for the Morrises. The jury disbelieved him. The real estate
purchase agreement identified him as the Morrises' agent, and the testimony from the
Morrises was unequivocal that Hatch acted as their agent. Hatch conceded he never
disclosed to the Morrises that he was a joint venturer with the Parkinsons and thus a
principal with the owner. Hatch conceded he never provided Morrises with the proper
disclosures concerning his dual agency relationship. As a result of these self serving
breaches, the jury determined according to Utah statute and agency regulations that Hatch
should forfeit to the Morrises the $9,792 commission Hatch collected. The jury correctly
arrived at the precise amount of Hatch's commission.
At trial, the jury correctly concluded that there were a number of items Linda
Hatch agreed with John Covey to provide to the Home, and which she failed to provide.
The jury valued those items at $5,000.
Finally, the trial court correctly held that because the Parkinsons entered into
covenants and warranties that by their terms survived closing, the attorneys fees clause of
the real estate purchase contract survived closing along with those covenants, and entitled
the Morrises to an award of attorneys fees as a result of the Parkinsons' breaches.
4

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Morrises brought suit on July 23, 1997. R. 5. Defendants were represented
initially by Anderson & Karrenberg. R. 16. More than a year later, on October 14, 1998
Anderson & Karrenberg withdrew, and Defendants' current counsel, Hill, Harrison,
Johnson & Schmutz then entered their appearance.

R. 68.

Trial of this matter

commenced on January 20, 1999. After four days of trial, the jury returned its verdict of
$57,012 on January 26, 1999.
The Defendants raised their claim of caveat emptor on at least four occasions.
Prior to trial, they raised it in the guise of a motion for partial summary judgment and by
way of a motion in limine. R. 140, 224. Those motions were fully briefed, and denied by
the trial court. Next, the Defendants raised the issue by trying to inject the defense into
proposed jury instructions.

The trial court rejected those instructions.

Finally,

Defendants raised the claim again in post trial motions, which were denied.
In post trial motions, Parkinsons argued against Morrises' motion for attorneys
fees. At the April 6, 1999 hearing, arguing against the application of this Court's ruling
in Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996) (cert, denied 919 P.2d 1208),
Parkinsons' attorney characterized this Court's statement of law therein as "absurd."
April 6, 1999 Hearing Transcript at p. 12.l
After this Court granted Morrises' motion for attorneys fees on July 14, 1999, R.
653, Judgment was entered on August 8, 1999. R. 670. Hatch filed a post-trial motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming there was insufficient evidence of his
precise percentage of the $12,240 real estate commission earned in the sale of the Home.
R. 681-99. The exchange at trial was as follows:
1

Plaintiffs have filed concurrently herewith a motion under Rule 11(h) Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure to Modify the Record to include transcripts of two hearings, April 6,
1999 and October 28, 1999.
5

Q.
that did you
A.
80/20 split
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

By ilie wa>. (lie $12,240 that was paid to Pine Valley, what percentage of
get9
I •• " '
.M. I haven't revie^-ei' ihe ^ecorcK ^ .; i Uxink we are on an
So it is likely you got 80 percent ot int
It could have been less. I don't recall.
But you did get that?
I did.
All right.
Correct.

/•

ii. L
>.*.*-,.>

R 9SS [in Ml
At the October 28, 1999 hearing on Hatch s motion foi judgment iu; ..: .-, . \. ,
the verdict on this issue, Morrises' counsel pointed out that in Hatch's deposition, n-. had
volunteered tl le fact tl lat 1 le \ < ras on an 80 20 split \ < ; ith his bi okei ,
prepared to impeach liii n w Itl i that testimonj at ti ial

•

. .

A ,

October 2 x

Transcript at pp. 10 11. Tlie trial court recalled this as he addressed Hatch >> counsel.
I do have a recollection of [Mr. Match's] testimony, and as I recau - 1 also
recall that [Mr. Hatch] was less than truthful on a number of issues, and that
Mr. Morris caught him being less than truthful on a number of issues. But
on this occasion [Mr. Hatch] was trying to duck the question by saying, "I
don't recall." Mr. Morris then prepared to go ahead and see if he was going
to have to impeach him or tie him down. As he went through it he tied him
down so he didn't have to impeach him.
[Mr. Hatch was sitting there 'knowing that this was his deposition
testimony, and so Mr. Morris] came back around and said, "But you did
get that?" And [MT. Hatch] said, "I did." And, "All right, so you got that
money?" "Correct." [Mr. Hatch] decided he better fess up.
Ortobcr 28, 1999 Hearing Transcript, pp. 18-19, i IK; trial court denied Defendants' post
In J motions mill DelcndanL appealed on Nu\ ember 29, 1999, K, 91 j ,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
'The only factual issues on appe tl aminims din nil "»"i IIK Iii I ft'tnidiiiif H I I

'*>**

r<mv trom \anoih evidentiary
' 'il

motion^. *t c\ •' Defendants failed io marshal am. *• \ at-^iK all oi the c\ -. \ -ice m mvor
of the

- -

l

u • ,, \ - miiiu tins Couii iu evaluate the trravitv of any errors that
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may lie in the trial court's various evidentiary rulings. Rule 11(e)(2) Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and common law required this. This failure to marshal the evidence
in favor of the jury's verdict is fatal to Defendants' appeal on these fact issues. Utah
Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcv. 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998).
Although not required to do so, under Rule 11(e)(2), Plaintiffs set forth here
record evidence supporting the jury's factual findings that Parkinsons breached their
warranties to the Morrises, that Hatch breached his duties to the Morrises as their real
estate agent, and that Linda Hatch breached her contractual duties to John Covey.
A.

Hatch and His Joint Venturers, Parkinsons, Shortchanged the
Home in Construction,

Before the Morrises ever saw the Home, it was doomed. When Hatch applied for
a building permit, he informed the City of Alpine that he was the owner of the Home. R.
956, p. 270. Hatch was a joint venture partner on the Home with the Parkinsons. R. 955,
p. 239-40. Yet he denied under oath at trial that he had any ownership interest in the
Home. Id. p. 239. When Hatch went to get a loan to build the Home, he provided the
bank with building specifications he never intended to follow. Id. p. 260. Although the
bank appraiser based his appraisal on Hatch's specifications showing a house with 5272
square feet in it, Hatch built the Home to have only 4300 square feet in it. Id. p. 302, Ex.
50. The plans Hatch gave to the bank called out radiant heating. R. at Ex. 50, 956, p.
265. But the cost of radiant heating could be as much as three times the amount of forced
air heating. R. 957 p. 786. Instead, and against the advice of his heating subcontractor,
Hatch installed one furnace. Id. p. 341. The system installed by Hatch was the least
possible expensive system. R. 957 p. 789.
The Home never had the requisite inspections completed by Alpine Building
Inspectors, and never had a certificate of occupancy issued on it, temporary or otherwise.
R. 955, pp. 184, 186, 193, 203-4. Yet the stucco contractor would not have applied final
7

coating on the MHCUI without Hatch * .-. ^L IOK* :••! *hai a!> inspections had been tun.:

stucco contract*

^;.-^ii\' succeeded

H v:v p . 4»

!>/•< , - .mn e\pen .^needed the

stucco job was "ugly in areas" and "cracking," R 958 p 1038
Hatch' s loan from the Bank call sd 01 it landscaping
received money from John Covey to finish landscaping. Id. p. 26V, Hatch purchased the
lea st expensive sprinkling plai i against the preference of the unlicensed, neighborhood
teenager he hired to install it I ::l p 160, 162 3

I he few er, cheaper and larger sprinkler

heads installed under Hatch's direction were too far apart to iii adcuuate eovcnu\
A

956 pp 465 6

gainst Stat 3 i e gi ilatioi is, nc track

? pi =

sprinkling system, thus potential!) pei mitting contaminated

* * ^ . * . • a > A i p n tc b

culinary water systems, Id p 4 / 1 2 I latch was made aware that he \\;^ luildine thi*
I I :)iiie iiitc a negati v e slope

!

R 955, p 165

negati\ e si

-

; ••

towards the Home. Id, p. 187.
u

buildine '--MMV! ^r told Hat ^

. .^, nL.^. IUS;JI\*
:

\ ; w are unsafe. aiui a>--

ui.iuunu $>15(s

r

."

>i a i ailing on the n*T>:k-* *-»
. ... ^en ongoing. 1 tu- A , , , ^ ,

v * ••..:.: *

i

w

^*«. i 4(»"

-j.

.<.;;; ... .ne

* hcie are o u \ \ .olations

vv<;icrpiiK>iing the homes lauv ;*>unddiion. I. \ M', K /^-

The plumbing coming into the Home \\.^ in ligh! ol fne number of fixtures in the Home.

i •.:. the pipes di

i:uai v

. •-. - u

i (,

r

>

•

i asked to

acknowledge this, Hatch would only characterize the plumbing installation as "unwise."
F 958 p. 963
Hatch spent 56% of his hardwood floor budget,, which he subcontracted to others.
R# 958 p 95Q4 On some of the items that Hatch's construction companj did oi I the
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Home, where he would be receiving income, he exceeded the budgeted amounts by
172%, 145%, 200%, and 143%. R. 958 pp. 973-4. On interior finish, Hatch spent only
46% of the budgeted amount. Id. p. 975-6. From bank loan proceeds, Hatch and his wife
took a $31,700 fee for "working" on the Home. Id. p. 999.
In sum, Hatch built a smaller house than he told the bank he was going to build.
Hatch stole money from the Home by building it as cheaply as he could. Even in cases
where his own company was doing the work and he greatly exceeded budget, the money
went to him, and not the Home. The overall workmanship in the Home was "very poor".
R. 956 p. 409. The quality of the finish work on the interior, left in the condition it was
in when Morrises purchased the home, was "poor to terrible." Id. p. 423. Interior
framing was "very poorly done." Id. p. 423-4. The workmanship on the Home was "as
poor a workmanship as [Morrises' damages expert] had seen in a construction project of
any type." R. 957 p. 546. As to habitability, the Home lacked adequate safety and
comfort. Id. pp. 546-7.
B.

The Morrises Bought The Home New and Unfinished, And Required A
Warranty.

On the Morrises5 first visit to the Home, Hatch told them it was not finished but
that he would be willing to finish the Home. R. 955, p. 64. The fact that Hatch and his
family were living in the Home at the time did not mean it was finished or used. Moving
his family into unfinished and uninspected homes he was in the process of building was
something Hatch did on other occasions. Id. p. 235. Among things still not finished at
the time, and in addition to those items covered by an agreement between John Covey
and Linda Hatch, were the window casings, Id. p. 66, circular stairway railing Id. p. 65,
and landscaping, Ex. 1, R. 955 p. 76. Hatch told the Morrises one furnace was enough
to heat the entire home. Id. p. 68.
9

* io<>5 *' - \ f - » r M^- entered into an agreement ; s purcha^i tin- Home
{ Agreemen;

...

' -ases \*ar*-*

...g.;..^

- '^. <i .•: '.^i ' - ;•

**

• !'*'

• mu because iuev ;a»: nought M<-h

1 because at the time of purchase thei

oer of itetik* •.. Miv. Hohit «... - e r e not timsnec ^ werp < : »

76-77,

ll

*

irrantv COM Ted quality, workmanship. hahitahiiiu

i' M.W. n . \gi<

prcvai- ^ pa
C.

T

* "

i^

ern^^H a

.

i

and systems .•* all
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D.

Hatch was M o r r i s e s ' Real KSIHIC Aj>nil i i i i i i ill Breached His Duties of
Disclosure to the Morrises.

I latch was the Morrises' real estate agent on their purchase of the Home. Ex.. 1, R.
955 p 75

Iri spite of the fact that the Parkinsons were 'willing to sell the HoTie for

$410,000, Hatch breached his duties and told tl le Morrises that the I Lome con:.: «-. t sell
for less than $435,000. R. 956 p. 288. He told the Morrises his being theii aizcni >- on ill i
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that the Morrises did not have someone other than Hatch as their agent. R. 956 p. 284.
Pine Valley Realty, Hatch's realty company, received a commission of $12,240 from the
sale of the Home. Id. p. 178, Ex. 4. Hatch received 80% of the commission, or $9,792.
Id. p. 241. Hatch never disclosed that he was a principal with the owner, and never
provided the disclosures made necessary by his dual agency relationship with both buyers
and sellers. Ex. 1. These failures violated his duties as the Morrises' real estate agent.
R. 956 pp. 313-4,318-9.
E.

After Closing, Linda Hatch, Hatch and Parkinsons Effectively Ignored
Morrises' Demands For Completion, and for Warranty Work That
Became Evident and Necessary.

Soon after closing, the weather turned and the Morrises noticed that the window
casings permitted cold air to come into the Home. R. 955 p. 80. It was within 3-5 weeks
of closing. R. 957 p. 641. When Hatch finally agreed to install a second furnace in the
Home, the thermostat for that furnace was left hanging on a wire in the mechanical room.
Ex. 41 ZZ, R. 955 p. 84. The system can't work with a thermostat in that location. R.
956 p. 351. And even with the second furnace, the home remains improperly heated,
because of Hatch's failure to properly locate return air vents in the home. R. 955, p. 91,
956 p. 352-3.
Patching and repainting the walls was never completed. R. 955 p. 88. The railing
for the circular stairway was installed just prior to trial, and remains a code violation in
spite of the Alpine Building Inspector's instructions to Hatch to install it correctly. Id.,
R. 955 pp. 190, 199, R. 956 pp. 407-8. The window casings were never finished, and
daylight was visible through them. R. 955 pp. 88-9, Exs. 41B, W, X, Y, Z, and AA.
Base trim was never installed in the kitchen. R. 955 p. 91. The spacing in the backyard
sprinkling system is inadequate. R. 955 p. 92. Hatch saw mud and water in the Home's
basement. Id. p. 895. Flooding in the basement caused carpet damage that Hatch never
11

repaired. R. 955 p. 136 I latch conceded the fact of constantfl.oodi.ngby leaving with
tl i,€ !\ Ionises a < \ et 'drj

fit their

frames. Id. 956 p 398-9.
Parkinsons received the demands from... the Morrises to complete the Home and do

p. .21.6. Hatch refused to give to the Morrises Parkinsons phone number when Morrises
desired to contact them, regarding warranty work

R 957 p 643. Parkinsons relied on

conceded Parkinsons made him responsible for fixing ihc warranty problems
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$15,000 to fix R 956 p. 288, 958 p. 969.
F.

Morrises Suffered Tents :)1IE rhousands of Dollars In Damages.

cost $8,000 R 956 p 355 Repairing the air conditioning system "vv ill cost $1,300 Id. p.
359, Installing a proper sprinkling system, in the Home's backyard will cost $3,300 This
Jinn

•

reiju-ieo to fix <.j. pfuhiem.s vviiu tin i\iuim
$95,150. Id. p. 495.
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Fixing the 16 interior doors to fit within their frames will cost $14,000. Id. p. 501.
Repainting the interior and finishing the oak floor will cost $9,815 and $8,111,
respectively. R. 957 p. 534-5. The total cost to correct the construction deficiencies on
the inside is $50,774. R. 957 p. 550. All of the foregoing are costs of remediation. If
Hatch had built the Home as he should have, it would have cost him only an additional
$11-14,000 to correctly do the exterior and an additional $1,600-1,700 to correctly do the
interior. Id. p. 541, 545-6. Instead, those monies went elsewhere.
G.

Morrises' Attorney Agreed to Not Charge Them, but Reserved the
Right to Seek Fees from Parkinsons,

Morrises' counsel agreed to represent the Morrises without charging them, but
requiring reimbursement of costs and reserving the right to pursue fees if the Morrises
prevailed against the Parkinsons. R. 397, 488, 512, 552. Also, Parkinsons' lawyers
billed over $27,000 for the month of January, 1999, alone. R. 445.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the judgment of the jury, and of the trial court, in every
respect. As to all factual matters, Defendants' failure to marshal evidence precludes
review by this Court of the trial court's denial of post-trial motions, and precludes fair
consideration of the various evidentiary rulings about which Defendants complain.
This Court should also affirm the trial court's rulings on the legal issues. The trial
court followed this Court's undisturbed precedents in ruling that the doctrine of caveat
emptor has no application where the buyer is purchasing a new home, and where the
buyer has express agreements with the seller to complete, alter, fix, or modify aspects of
the home.
The trial court also followed undisturbed precedent from this Court in ruling that
the doctrine of merger, embodied in the Agreement's abrogation clause, does not
preclude enforcement of agreements collateral to conveying title. Similarly, attorneys
13

fees provisions survive with those covenants and apply when a breach of surviving
co ' enants is established, as it w as hei e
Finally, this Court should affirm the trial court's fee award, based as it was on a
very detailed and thorough consideration MI'a]J elements relevant to what a reasonable
allmiieys fee in llms case wnii. Il I

(hen icnidikl llns case lo llic liiitll u nil

for a determination of attorneys fees and costs on appeal
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO
THEIR CLAIMS OF EVIDENTIARY ERRORS BY THE TRIAL CO! JRT

and should affirm, the jury's findings of breach and damages against the Defendants.
Rules 50(b) and 59(a)(6) I Jtah R ules of Civil Procedun provide »-• e^encr

that

Defendants maj obtain a ji ldgment in til leii fai • 01 , not i itl is
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them, or they may obtain a new trial, respectively, if the • *- inadequate i-videnio to
support the ji 11 ] verdict

In post trial motions Defend::**?

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jui > ' 's findi *c ,
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Morrises $42,220 for breach of the real estate purchase agreement's warranties.
A.

Den.) lug Post ' I i ial Motions m as 1 '"i opei

In weighing the adequacy of the ev idence on other issues, this court must vie\ \ all
evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to
1
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properly evaluating the trial court's denial of post trial motions
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A nd because there is

and that Guy I latch owes the Morrises his real estate commission of $9,792, this I ourt
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should affirm the trial court's denial of Defendants' post trial motions that were based on
the evidence.
B.

Evidence At Trial Supports The Jury In AH Respects.

As to Defendants' claims that there were various evidentiary rulings by the trial
court that should give rise to a reversal of the jury verdict, again Defendants' failure to
marshal the evidence precludes this Court from fairly or effectively determining the
substance, materiality, and "harm" of any such errors.
The evidence shows, without the benefit of reasonable inferences, that Elizabeth
Morris and Guy Hatch were the real negotiators and parties to the Covey Contract.
Elizabeth Morris testified that the "decorate per plan" portion of the agreement called for,
among other things, refinishing the wood floors and repainting the interior. The Covey
Contract also expressly called out the installation of sod and sprinkling in the Home's
backyard.

Mr. Hatch installed a cheap system against the recommendation of his

installer, and even Defendants' own expert acknowledged the deficiency of the system.
Evidence from Plaintiffs' experts showed damages on the landscaping of at least
$3,300, without the cost of new sod, $8,111 for refinishing the wood floors, and $9,815
for patching walls and repainting the interior. This total evidence of at least $21,226
damages under the Covey Contract supports the jury verdict against Linda Hatch for
$5,000.
Hatch complains that the amount of the commission that he received was not
within the recollection of his broker at trial, and thus the jury should not have awarded
the sum of $9,792.00 against him. However, Hatch did testify that his agreement with his
broker was that he was to receive eighty percent of the total commission, which
commission was three percent of the sales price.

Thus, it was a simple matter of

mathematics for the jury to deduce that Hatch received a commission of .024 percent
(80% X 3%) of the original purchase price of $408,000. The math on that equation
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equals the precise dollar amount of $9 ,792.00 awarded b y the jury. The j u r y ' s simple
':
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Thus,,, this

Court should affirm the j u r y ' s award of $9,792 against Hatch.
I he lads aluiri, i show lliall lilt fin \ llliiitl ample !«iiotiiiiii . In liml lln I nin caches •! (In
statutory, ethical and contractual duties they found, and to find the Morrises suffered
damages.

For these reasons, this Coi irt slioi ild affirm

the jur\ *

notwithstanding any errors there might have been, I: I it vv hich errors vu s .

judgment
.evertheless

harmless. Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
n.

I HE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE DOCTRINE OF
CAVEAT EMPTOR IS NEITHER AVAILABLE WITH A NEW HOME
SALE, NOR MAY IT TRUMP EXPRESS WARRANTIES.
Parkinsons do not seriously contest the breaches of their warranties

a ir ^nnt

But thc\ <2<* • -v '••' !aim that caveat emptor precludes a miii'M <>* ~

IIK newness ot the Home and uie I'ai^msoiis
Parkinson- tr • *•-<•!•
emptor

nlraUual obl.L'.r

Vd^kiitb^^n^ complain thai because a n u ^ K

express wanunii'
*1-* -in:'

. , 'w<-A'~

only the
V*. crises'

^,\«ude
' cuveut

M^bierns \\\\i\ ti ^ lome were

apparent when the Morrises \- *: ri.i tlx Home, the Morrises should ix . .irreii irorn
cc n lplaining aboi it them

A ccepting thi

r

•

•. - *, • : .»• «*,

rhis Court should reject the d e f e n d a n t U J U I - .*iat tin *k w-c\.* m the * -mc. wmch
the Morrises proved to be breaches of the express warranties set forth in the Agreement,
is

i t*uu, Utah State Medical Assoc, v. Liu-

MOU, (>;o l\,c r43

(Utah 1982), apparently applies only to "i ised" property, Oth^r. more rceep* deacons
fi : 'ii l t! lis Coi u t and from till le I Jtal I Si lpi eme Coi n It si ic

..

i

application in this case. The Morrises were free to contract with the Parkinsons for the
purpose of securing proper completion of the Home, and that such completion would be
warranted for a period of two years following the purchase of the Home.
In Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), this Court considered the
claims of purchasers of a home for alleged design and construction defects. There, this
Court expressly noted limitations on application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in Utah.
One exception is that the doctrine "has eroded in the sale of new residential housing." Id.
at 1389. Also, the Supreme Court of Utah has held caveat emptor applies only in the
absence of an express agreement.
[I]n the absence of express agreement or misrepresentation,
the purchaser is expected to make his own examination and
draw his own conclusions as to the condition of the land
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 1987) (emphasis by Court)
(citation omitted). Here, the Parkinsons concede, as they must, that an express agreement
creating a two year warranty period for quality, workmanship, habitability, and systems
of all kinds was in place and survived closing on the purchase of the Home. This express
agreement relieved the Morrises from the burden of living with problems visible to them
at the time of contract.
For the reasons that the Home was new at the time it was purchased, and because
there exists an express agreement between the sellers and purchasers of the home, the
doctrine of caveat emptor never had any application in this case. Thus, this Court should
affirm the judgment of the jury, and affirm the trial court's repeated rejection of that
defense.
III.

PARKINSONS OWE MORRISES ATTORNEYS FEES.
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that as a matter of law, Parkinsons

are liable to the Morrises for a reasonable attorneys fee. The Parkinsons acknowledged
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they breached their warranties to the Morrises, the jury found that the damages from the
breach amounted to $42,220, and the Agreement provides for fees to the prevailing party.
Finally, this Court should also affirm the judgment of the trial court which found, in its
broad discretion, that a reasonable attorneys fee was $48,567.
A.

The Merger Doctrine, And Thus the Abrogation Clause Does Not
Apply To The Agreement.

Recently, this Court verified that the doctrine of merger, and a contract's
abrogation clause, will not preclude an attorneys fee award if the prevailing party
establishes a default under the terms of the contract.
1. The trial court correctly followed this Court in awarding fees.
The trial court based its attorneys fee award on this Court's decision in Mavnard v.
Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996) (cert, denied 919 P.2d 1208). There, this Court
noted that the abrogation clause in an earnest money agreement is "a contractual
statement of the merger doctrine." Id. at 451. While Parkinsons' attorney characterized
this as "absurd," the Utah Supreme Court saw fit to deny certiorari.
In Mavnard, this Court set forth four exceptions to the merger doctrine, including
the "existence of rights collateral to the contract of sale." Id. At 450.

In denying the

claim for attorneys fees in that case, this Court set forth its reasoning.
The sellers did not point to any express warranties,
covenants, or agreements on which buyers defaulted. . . . In
short, paragraph "N" does not contemplate an award of
attorney fees for sellers just because buyers sued.
In sum, attorney fees may be awarded under the instant
contract only when one party can show that the other party
has defaulted on an explicit covenant or agreement contained
in the earnest money agreement.
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Id. at 452. In other words, this Court recognized that the attorneys fee clause attaches to
every covenant of an earnest money agreement, and arises with every breach. And if a
covenant survives closing by its own terms, the attorneys fee clause survives with it.
In contrast to the fact pattern in Maynard, Parkinsons' breach of their post closing
warranties to the Morrises is precisely the situation this Court in Mavnard declared as
appropriate for an award of attorneys fees. Here, Parkinsons must concede now, as Hatch
conceded on their behalf, that they breached the express warranties contained in the
Agreement, and that such warranties were collateral to conveying title . . . extending two
years beyond closing. Consequently, Parkinsons' obligation to pay a reasonable
attorneys fee for their breach of post-closing agreements survived closing, and remains an
enforceable obligation.
2.

Parkinsons' cases support the trial court's fee award,

Parkinsons rely on the 1966 decision of Kelsey v. Hansen, 419 P.2d 198 (Utah
1966) for the proposition that an earnest money agreement's abrogation clause will
eviscerate collateral agreements. There, however, the collateral agreement at issue was
"preliminary, loosely drawn and almost incoherent." Id. at 198. It was unknown whether
the promise was to be performed before or after closing. Contrast that here to express
warranties that Parkinsons concede are unambiguous, that extend beyond closing for a
period of two years, and which Parkinsons concede they breached. Further, Parkinsons
failed to point out that the holding in Kelsey was distinguished, and impliedly limited, by
the Utah Supreme Court in Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168, 170 n.4 (Utah 1977).
Defendants also cited this court to the case of Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance
Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that under the merger doctrine, all
clauses of a sale contract are merged into the final deed at closing, and thus there are no
attorneys fees awardable under the Agreement. The Espinoza case has no application
here because the Parkinson contract promised more than a simple conveyance of title. In
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Espinoza. the plaintiffs sought recovery against a title insurer because of a defect in title,
and against the grantors for the same breach. In refusing to award attorneys fees, the
court there stated that the contract providing for fees was extinguished at closing. Id. at
348.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the importance of suing on a title claim,
versus suing on a claim collateral to conveying title. In Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that when a real property sales contract
contains agreements that are collateral to conveyance of title, those obligations survive
closing.
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recognizes, is
applicable when the acts to be performed by the seller in a
contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer....
However, if the original contract calls for performance
by the seller of some act collateral to conveyance of title, his
obligations with respect thereto survive the deed and are not
extinguished by it. . . . When seller's performance is intended
by the parties to take place at some time after the delivery of
the deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated by the
parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full
performance on the part of the seller, absent some manifest
intent to the contrary.
Id. at 169-170 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
There are no title defects in this case. Defendants' reliance on the merger doctrine
and upon the Agreement's abrogation clause is misplaced for the reason that the
Agreement expressly provided for covenants that were collateral to the conveyance of
title. It was those collateral covenants that the Parkinsons breached.
Thus, because paying attorneys fees as a result of breaching collateral agreements
is, itself, collateral to conveying title, the attorneys fee clause survived closing with those
breached covenants. Here, the jury found that the Parkinsons breached the two-year
warranty of workmanship, quality, habitability, and systems of all kinds.
20

Both the

duration and character of these warranties expressly make them collateral to the
conveyance, and thus the Agreement was not merged in the final deed. It also bears
noting that in Stubbs, the court affirmed the attorneys fee award of the trial court. Id. at
171. Because the trial court correctly followed the law set forth in Stubbs and Maynard.
this Court should affirm Parkinsons' liability for attorneys fees.
B.

Parkinsons Are Obligated To Pay A Reasonable Attorneys Fee.

Parkinsons next claim that because the Morrises' attorney agreed to perform his
services without requiring payment from them, the Parkinsons have no liability. This is
wrong as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court's implicit acknowledgment that fees
may be awardable even in a contingent fee case moots any claim by Defendants that the
Morrises' fee agreement with their counsel precludes a recovery. "Whether the attorneys
provided their services pro bono, at a discount, or at full market rate does not affect a
determination of reasonable attorney's fees, (citations omitted)." Barker v. Utah Public
Srv. Comm.. 970 P.2d 702, 711 (Utah 1998). The Supreme Court of Utah made this
statement expressly in response to the idea that the attorneys "did not really expect to
receive payment." Id.
To hold that the Morrises must legally owe their attorneys fees, or pay them before
they are entitled to the attorneys fee award called out in the Agreement would give rise to
innumerable questions, and attacks, from which trial courts could never extricate a clear
rationale for ruling. For example, what if the attorney agrees to reduce his charges as
between him and his clients? What if the clients file bankruptcy to avoid paying their
attorney? What if the clients go on a years long payment plan to satisfy their obligations
to their attorney? The variations are limitless.
But here, the Agreement could not be more simply and clearly worded. "In any
action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and
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reasonable attorney's fees." Ex. 1.

There is nothing in this language which requires

either that the Morrises be legally obligated to pay their attorney any money, or that they
actually pay fees to their attorney. Simply, the Agreement conditioned the Parkinsons'
liability on none of the above variations . . . only that the Morrises prevail on their claims
arising from the Agreement. That condition is satisfied here, and this Court should affirm
the trial court.
C.

The Fees Awarded Are Reasonable.

The trial court issued a seven page ruling on July 14, 1999, in which it fully
considered all of the requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court and Rule 1.5 of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct before awarding Morrises a reasonable attorneys
fee of $48,567. This Court should affirm the amount of the trial court's fee award
because Parkinsons have failed to show patent error or a clear abuse of discretion in the
award. Instead, Parkinsons claim the award is unreasonable because the jury verdict
allegedly exceeded an offer of judgment by only $12,000, and because Defendants
allegedly only incurred $27,806 in fees defending against all claims. Both of these
claims are insupportable.
It is true the Parkinsons' offered to accept judgment for $30,000. But judgment
exceeded this amount by over $80,000, not the $12,000 claimed by Parkinsons. There
was no attribution in Parkinsons' offer among the claims in the Complaint, or for
attorneys fees. The only reasonable inference is that Parkinsons hoped to settle aU claims
with the $30,000. Because the total amount of the judgment on all claims exceeded
$110,000, Parkinsons' offer of nearly a quarter of this amount does not suggest patent
error or a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in the amount of fees awarded, in
particular when the Parkinsons conceded they were in breach.
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Secondly, the Parkinsons' claim that they only spent $27,000 on all fees is belied
by their counsel's affidavit. Defendants' current law firm, Hill, Harrison, Johnson &
Schmutz, apparently billed the Defendants the amount of $27,806.00 just for the month
of January, 1999, when trial was held. Parkinsons conveniently failed to mention that
they had employed the firm of Anderson & Karrenberg at the beginning of the suit, which
then withdrew after the case had been litigated, and had been pending for over a year.
Further, there is no mention of the amount of fees incurred by Parkinsons' attorneys for
all months, from July, 1997 through the end of 1998, before they incurred the $27,000
during the month of trial in January, 1999. Here, too, Parkinsons cannot show patent
error or clear abuse of discretion, and this Court should affirm the amount of the trial
court's award.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to affirm the
jury's and trial court's rulings in every respect, and to remand this case to the trial court
for determination of a reasonable attorneys fee and costs incurred on appeal, pursuant to
Rule 34 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Respectfully Submitted this TV* day of July, 2000.
SNELL & WILMER/, L.L.P.

Mark O. Morris
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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